essentials. There is no disputation that: the climate is changing; various places in Canada (particularly the Northern Territories and Maritime Provinces) are literally in the 'eye of the climate change storm'; and drastic actions must be taken to mitigate and/or adapt to climate change impacts. 5 Based on the above principles, the PCF identifies carbon pricing, complementary actions, adaptation and resilience, and clean technology as its pillars, highlighting carbon pricing as its central component. 10 To determine whether the PCF is equitable, flexible and potentially effective, it is necessary to identify the metrics with which these themes can be measured and assess to what extent the Framework features the identified metrics. Further, to adequately assess the PCF, it is important to answer the following: What are the emission reduction targets of provinces and territories (PTs)? How were the obligations allotted? How are the obligations to be met? Although the PCF's pillars speak to the last question, it is not explicit on the exact emission reduction obligations of PTs. The issue of burden allocation/sharing is foundational to climate policies, particularly, to adjudging the equitability of such policies. 11 While the subject of burden sharing will be considered more closely later in this work, what follows is an attempt to frame the metrics with which the effectiveness, flexibility, and equitability of the PCF can be assessed.
a. Effectiveness Metrics: Emission reduction, cost efficiency and political 'legitimacy' are the key metrics of an effective climate policy. 12 With carbon pricing at its core, it is doubtful if the PCF satisfies these effectiveness metrics. For example, it is widely agreed that for Canada to achieve its 2030 commitment, country wide carbon pricing must "start at $30 per tonne of CO2 and rise $15 annually to $200 in 2030". 13 Contrariwise, the PCF contemplates a pricing 10 Ibid at 2 -3, 7. 11 Christoph Bohringer, et al "Sharing the Burden for Climate Change Mitigation in the Canadian Federation" (2015) 48:4 Canadian Journal of Economics 1350 at 1351. 12 While effectiveness in respect of emission insists on the actual lowering of emissions, cost efficiency and political legitimacy speak to "ability to lower emissions at a manageable cost" and political acceptability, public support and ability of such initiatives "to survive governmental turnover" respectively. See Hartman, Supra note 1 at 13. Mark Jaccard et al, added "administrative feasibility" to the effectiveness metrics. See Mark Jaccard et al, "Is Win-Win Possible? Can Canada's Government Achieve Its Paris Commitment … and Get Re-Elected?" (September 20, 2016) online:
<http://rem-main.rem.sfu.ca/papers/jaccard/Jaccard-Hein-Vass%20CdnClimatePol%20EMRG-REM-SFU%20Sep%2020%202016.pdf> at 3. Political legitimacy is used interchangeably with political acceptability here. 13 Mark Jaccard, et al Ibid at 22 -23. system starting at $10 per tonne in 2018, rising by $10 per year to $50 per tonne in 2022.
While this low pricing frame is apparently to make the carbon pricing system cost effective, it is arguable that it has or can achieve this. This is in part because the concept of cost effectiveness is jurisdiction dependent. A cost-effective price range in British Columbia might be deemed unacceptable in Manitoba. This is evident in the reluctant acceptance and implementation of carbon pricing in provinces and territories, with British Colombia and Quebec (which all had varying pricing systems in place before the PCF), being the only jurisdictions with 'concrete' carbon pricing systems, a year after the PCF was made. 14 Carbon pricing has been described as the most cost-effective tool against climate change. 15 But, as noted elsewhere, cost effectiveness "is only one criterion used to assess a policy instrument. … (there is) also need to know whether the instrument will actually be effective in solving the policy problem … (and) whether it is politically feasible to implement the instrument at levels and intensities that will enable it to be effective". 16 There is no 'inherent' effectiveness in carbon pricing (or any climate tool), effectiveness is a function of the mode and scope of conceptualization and implementation. The PCF-prescribed carbon pricing neither has the intensity nor scope to be effective. 17 But this is only part of the story. Assuming 14 It is noteworthy that other provinces except Saskatchewan are reported to be at different stages of establishing some sort of carbon pricing regime, with noticeable reluctance however. An example of this is Nova Scotia, which had previously insisted in the non-necessity of an explicit carbon pricing regime in its jurisdiction, but which has 'grudgingly' rolled out an in-province cap and trade plan which is doubtful to substantially achieve any emission reduction aim. See generally Pan Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change: First Annual Synthesis Report on the Status of Implementation -December 2017, 2-3. As earlier noted, while Ontario has indicated its intention to withdraw from the Western Climate Initiative (joint carbon market with California and Quebec), Alberta has notified that it will cease to adhere to the PCF. 15 the Canadian version of carbon pricing even satisfies the cost efficiency metric of effectiveness and as some have contended, it contributes to emission reduction, what are the chances that it will (as designed) satisfy the 'political legitimacy' metric? There remains a likelihood of active or passive opposition to this pricing-centric approach in various provinces and territories. Confirming this position, a recent study finds that although deemed cost effective, Canadians generally do not support carbon pricing. 18 It is this absence of support (depending on the province) that provinces opposed to carbon pricing have, in a way, latched unto. The PCF's response to this is its backstop plan; applicable to PTs which, at the end of 2018, do not have either an explicit price-based system (carbon tax like British Columbia's or a hybrid approach comprised of carbon levy and output-based pricing system like Alberta's), or a cap and trade system. 19 It can however be argued that the backstop plan further risks the PCF's political legitimacy not only in terms of acceptance by and collaboration with PTs, but also subjecting it to the vagaries of governmental turnover; an Achilles-heel of past pan-Canadian climate policy attempts. 20 The political dimension of effectiveness is often downplayed in the design of lower-end estimates put the damage of emitting 1 tonne of CO2 at EUR 30, 90% of all emissions from energy use are priced at less than that when we look at 41 countries representing 80% of world energy use. Moreover, 60% of emissions are not subject to any price whatsoever. We cannot continue like this if reducing greenhouse gas emissions in a costeffective manner is a true policy objective". See OECD, "Effective Carbon Rates 20 MOWAT's study drew ample lessons from Canada's Kyoto-protocol era National Climate Change Process (NCCP) which like the PCF started as a collaborative venture of FPTs but ended abruptly when the Federal Government's unilateral ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The study emphasised that "the involvement and agreement of all 14 Canadian governments will … ensure the survival of this strategy (PCF) despite inevitable governmental turnover … unless this bargain can withstand the rotation of political perspectives in power that is natural in a democratic state, it climate policies. As noted by Jaccard et al, "…trade-offs between economic efficiency and political acceptability must be considered, especially given that political acceptability constraints have repeatedly prevented effective climate policy…We have to reduce emissions, which means that we must have effective policies that succeed politically". 21 Paying attention to political effectiveness is critical in the design of effective and lasting climate policies. One way of doing this is having a more nuanced approach in dealing with climate change, while another option is the adoption of flexible regulations as an alternative to carbon pricing. 22 These two options will be considered more extensively later in this work.
b. Flexibility Metrics: The above effectiveness theme is directly impacted by the concept of flexibility. Arguably, the flexibility level of a climate policy determines the extent to which it will be cost efficient, politically acceptable, and ultimately, effective in reducing emissions. 23 Following the classification of Toman et al, the flexibility of a climate policy can be determined by its 'what', 'where', 'how' and 'when' constituents. 24 Equally vital to the determination of how flexible a policy is, is the 'why' metric. 25 Table 1 below shows the underlying questions which inform each of these metrics: 26 will not be successful." See Hartman, et al, supra note 1 at 18, 30 -32. It is worth pointing out that climate policies are at the centre of current political rhetoric, with conservative candidates in different provinces very clear on their intentions to roll back carbon pricing policies in Alberta and Ontario. See generally Kim Trynacity, "Alberta Carbon Tax Fuels Attach ad, fundraising by UCP", CBC News (11 January 2018) online: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/carbon-tax-alberta-ndp-united-conservative-party-1.4481776 and Mike Crawley, "Ontario PC Leadership Rivals Scrap Carbon Tac from Platform", CBC News (8 February 2018) online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/caroline-mulroney-doug-ford-christine-elliott-carbon-tax-1.4524469>. 21 Jaccard, et al, supra note 11 at 8 -9. 22 Jaccard, et al, supra note 11 at 3. 23 See Michael Toman, et al, "The Economics of "When" Flexibility in the Design of Greenhouse Gas Abatement Policies" (1999) Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 99-38-REV, 2. 24 Ibid 25 Motivations for taking climate actions defer. While for some it is a need to protect their biosystems and specific climate prone industries, like the agricultural sector, others simply want to be industry leaders in the burgeoning global green industry. Yet, the need to take action is literally existential to others given their unique geographical location. These diverse motivations will inevitably impact the components of various action plans. It is therefore necessary to put these motivations into consideration while designing climate policies and allotting responsibilities. 26 Apart from the 'why' metric, the questions contained in the above 
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QUESTIONS
What Metric
What greenhouse gases does the policy cover? Is trading among the various gases and sinks allowed?
Where Metric
Is the policy geography sensitive? Has it taken a locationbased differentiation approach to the reduction of identified GHGs?
How Metric
Does the policy allow constituent parties (PTs) to achieve set-targets using instruments peculiar to them and by maximizing their comparative advantages?
When Metric
Does the policy allow targets to be met at periods when they can be achieved most efficiently? Is the policy phased?
Why Metric
Has the policy considered the distinct drivers of constituent parties' climate commitments?
In purporting to be a flexible framework, the PCF seems to focus on the 'how metric':
"provinces and territories continue to have the flexibility to design their own policies to meet emissions-reduction targets" 27 , with little or no reckoning with the other flexibility metrics. It is, albeit, contestable that the PCF can be described as 'how-flexible', given its rigid insistence on the adoption of explicit carbon pricing by PTs. The framework makes British Colombia's (BC) carbon tax the 'gold standard', prescribing that at the very least, other provinces' pricing system should cover the same scope as BC's. 28 Assuming BC's carbon tax has been effective in reducing emission, 29 there is no guarantee that this approach will work in other provinces 27 PCF, supra note 2 at 7. 28 PCF, supra note 2 at 50. 29 While lauded as being a 'pure' example of a revenue-neutral, it has been argued that it has not been an effective tool in reducing BC's emissions. An indicator of this is the province's 2.1% decrease in emissions compared to its 2007 levels, although in its climate action plans, it committed to a reduction of 33% below 2007 levels. It is generally agreed that this target is unattainable. See generally Judith Lavoie, "BC Quietly Releases Emissions Update that Shows It'll Blow 2020 Climate Target", Desmog Canada (12 January 2018) online: < https://www.desmog.ca/2018/01/12/b-cquietly-releases-emissions-update-shows-it-ll-blow-2020-climate-target> and BC provincial Greenhouse Gas Inventory (2017) online: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/climate-change/data/provincialinventory/2015/2015_provincial_inventory.xlsx. It has however been noted elsewhere that BC's "emissions would gave be between 5% and 15% higher if it had not put its carbon tax in place", and that the reasons for the increase is the freezing of the tax at $30 in 2012 and its strong economic and population growth. See Canada's Ecofiscal Commission, "Clearing the Air: How Carbon Pricing Helps Canada Fight Climate Change" (April 2018) online: < and/or territories, considering that the BC carbon tax system was tailor-made for the province.
Conditions attributable to the relative success of the system, like the abundance of hydroelectric potentials and the prior development of this pre-2008, and the fact that only a limited part of the emissions of the province are from trade exposed sectors, are largely unavailable in other provinces. 30 Taking cognizance of what, where, how, when and why metrics of flexibility will inform a more nuanced approach to carbon pricing under the PCF. them. 34 Although it is clear that Canada's 523 Mt commitment under the Paris Agreement translates into the collective 2030 target of FPTs, the PCF is very nebulous on the burden to be borne by each federating unit. What exists, however, is an impression that Canada's 30% reduction commitment, compared to 2005 emission level under the PA, translates to 30% reduction of emission in each province. 35 The absence of explicit burden allocation is, in part, responsible for the current deficit between provincial commitments and Canada's NDC under the Paris Agreement. 36 In this regard, it has been argued that "an allocation of responsibility between the provinces and territories for specific emissions reductions that add up to the total required to close the PCF-Paris gap" is essential. 37 The unclarity of the PCF on PTs' allocations regardless, the sameness of its carbon pricing mandate for all jurisdictions, gives it away as leaning more towards symmetrical allocation. This, to an extent, postures the framework as inequitable and constitutes a portent threat to its success. 38 It can hardly be argued that a differentiated allocation approach is not crucial to Canada's quest to meet its 2030 and long-term climate aspirations. Bohringer et al., in their work, identified ex-ante and ex-post based allocation rules as modes through which burdens can be shared among PTs in Canada. 39 The absence of specific targets or the disparate use of different types of targets was identified by the Auditors-General collaborative report as one of the challenges of the current Canadian climate change regime. The report argues that "a clear and measurable emission reduction target provides a benchmark against which progress can be measured. Targets also help promote transparency and accountability". See Collaborative Report, Supra note 4 at 4, 6. 37 Hartman, et al, supra note 1 at 22. 38 While symmetrical allocation has its advantages, it has been criticized as being unjust and inefficient as unequals are unfairly treated as equals. See Ringius, supra note 30 at 136. 39 While they defined ex-ante allocation rules as dealing with "fairness … from the perspective of economic, social, or environmental conditions that exist in different regions prior to implementation of emission mitigation policy"; ex-post make "an unambiguous case for any of the burden sharing rules individually, some combination of the rules should likely form the basis for a "fair" sharing of the burden of emission reduction throughout Canada". 40 The European Union triptych approach provides an example of how such combination of rules can be achieved. Whatever allocation formula is adopted, it is agreed that provinces like Saskatchewan and Alberta will have to bear more of the burden of emission reduction, as their oil and gas industries serve as the single highest sectoral source of emission in Canada. 41 To assuage the loss aversion 42 of these provinces, it is crucial to incorporate mechanisms to mitigate the likely asymmetric socio-economic impacts in any pan-Canadian climate policy. 43 No such provision has been made in the PCF.
The above analysis focused largely on the carbon pricing component of the PCF, in the light of the central nature of carbon pricing to the entire framework. It, however, does not play down, in anyway, the usefulness of other pillars, particularly complementary actions, to the workability of the framework. It is, albeit, likely that the failure of the PCF to clearly allocate burdens to PTs will be counterproductive. Considering existing shortfall between PCF commitments and Canada's commitment to the PA, and the outright failure of provinces like Saskatchewan to commit to specific targets, it is apparent that the system of non-descript voluntary emission reduction commitments by PTs is riddled with flaws. Some of the themes considered under this rules apply to "regional wellbeing after policy implementation". They further grouped 'sovereignty, egalitarian and ability to pay' criteria under ex-ante rules, while 'horizontal equity, utilitarian and Rawlsian' criteria under the ex-post rules. See Bohringer et al, supra note 10 at 1356 -1357. 40 Bohringer et al, supra note 10 at 1378 -1379. 41 Alberta and Saskatchewan are the highest oil and gas producing provinces in Canada, and they have the highest per capita emission in the country. The oil and gas industry contribute approximately 26% of Canada's total GHG emissions. See Government of Canada, supra note 34. 42 Loss aversion entails focus of policy makers on the "costs/losses associated with proposed changes instead of the expected benefits/gains … lost jobs, lost revenue, lost opportunities if business moves offshore". See Megan Bowman, "Nudging Effective Climate Policy Design" (2011) 35: 2/3/4 International Journal of Global Energy Issues 242 at 246. 43 Hartman, et al, supra note 1 at 21 -22. part will be further highlighted in the light of the arguments made by Saskatchewan against the PCF.
III. The Prairie Resilience: Claims and Rebuttals
In the foregoing part, the PCF was viewed through the tri-lenses of effectiveness, flexibility and equity. As will be noted here, Saskatchewan's refusal to commit to the PCF is not disconnected from some of the issues already discussed. Saskatchewan has primarily anchored its nonendorsement of the PCF on its opposition to carbon pricing as the framework's pivot, the PCF's one-cap-fits-all approach, federal overreach and the potential dire economic implications of the framework (particularly, carbon pricing) for the province. 44 Saskatchewan's opposition to carbon pricing deserves a closer look.
Saskatchewan's Case Against Carbon Pricing
Citing British Columbia's carbon tax, Ontario's cap and trade, and Alberta's hybrid approach as examples, Saskatchewan disputes the effectiveness of carbon pricing. 45 This objection is a mixed grill of the existing criticism of the unlikelihood of the current carbon pricing design inducing behavioural change and the province's specific concern about the inappropriateness of the mechanism in the light of its own vulnerabilities. As stated in its climate change plan, Saskatchewan did not subscribe to the PCF because: economy and geography don't allow for easy alternatives … a simple tax will not result in the innovations required to actually reduce emissions. 46 It is projected that a $50 per tonne carbon tax will cost the Saskatchewan economy in excess of $2.5 billion annually. 47 Another study has put the "direct, indirect and induced impact" of such carbon tax on Saskatchewan's annual GDP at about $1.3 billion and total job loss of about 4,452. 48 Saskatchewan argues that unlike other provinces, its global-market, trade-exposed industries have "limited opportunity to transfer their GHG reduction costs to customers". 49 Corroborating these concerns, a study commissioned by the Johnson Shoyama Graduate School of Public Policy finds that:
The imposition of a carbon tax at a rate of $50 per tonne as proposed by the federal government would have significant cost implications in a number of Saskatchewan sectors and would add substantially to the cost of maintaining and operating households, unless significant behavioural change occurred. These financial impacts could also be expected to have a negative impact on the Saskatchewan economy in terms of the level of GDP and the number of jobs in the province… 50
In coming to the above conclusion, there is an apparent presumption that carbon tax will apply economy-wide with no exemption, the non-recognition of the revenue-neutral feature of the proposed backstop policy and a representation that the backstop only consists of carbon tax. On the contrary, the backstop is designed as a two-sided concept consisting of a carbon levy applied to fossil fuels and "an output-based pricing system for industrial facilities that emit above a 46 See Government of Saskatchewan, "Prairie Resilience: A Made-in-Saskatchewan Climate Change Strategy" (2017) online: http://publications.gov.sk.ca/documents/66/104890-2017%20Climate%20Change%20Strategy.pdf at 2. 47 Sectoral breakdown of this projected amount ($ millions): Electricity -$757; Oil and Gas -$722; Commercial/Industrial Natural Gas Usage -$247; Agriculture fertilizer -$214; Diesel -$174; Gasoline -$121; Diesel (farm) -$103; Residential Gas Heating -$86; Railway -$40; Other fuel -$21; Gasoline (farm) -$20. See Government of Saskatchewan, supra note 43 at 25. 48 Jeremy Rayner, et al, supra note 15 at 34. 49 Government of Saskatchewan, supra note 41 at 26. In a research on the impact of carbon tax on employment in British Columbia, while it was found that the tax supported job growth in the green sector, substantial job loss was recorded in emission intensive and trade exposed sectors. See Akio Yamazaki, "Jobs and Climate Policy: Evidence from British Columbia's revenue-neutral carbon tax" (2017) 83 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 197 at 212. 50 Rayner, supra note 15 at 37. certain threshold, with an opt-in capability for smaller facilities with emissions below the threshold". 51 Further, since the coverage of the policy is aligned to BC's carbon tax scope, "emissions from non-combustion CO2 in industrial processes, methane emissions from natural gas extraction and transmission, methane and nitrous oxide, emissions from agriculture, CO2 emissions from forestry" etc., are exempted. 52 Importantly, the Backstop guarantees that "revenues will remain in the jurisdiction of origin" and can be used as deemed appropriate by provinces. 53 The identified features of the backstop policy, in many ways, seemingly, provide responses to the concerns raised by Saskatchewan. Worthy of special mention here are the potential impacts of the exemptions offered under the policy and return of revenue to provinces.
Jeremy Rayner, et al, in their research, projected that an additional revenue of $2.5 billion will be generated for Saskatchewan via carbon tax and gave different scenarios under which the disbursement of the fund can be used to effectively offset the cost of the initiative. 54 Adopting Statistics Canada's output-input models, investing $2.5billion in operating universities (which has a multiplier effect of 1.05 for GDP and 11.35 for jobs), will boost the province's GDP by more than $2.6billion and add 26,454 jobs in the province. 55 Simply put, in the scenario, the projected cost of economic and job loss is less than the benefits in GDP increase and job creation 51 Environment and Climate Change Canada, supra note 18 at 5. As will be shown later, the second limb of the backstop policy is akin to Saskatchewan's output-based proposal. 52 in the green industry. Rendered differently, while one way of considering carbon pricing is as a direct emission reduction tool, another perspective is as a 'facilitative tool'. That is, a tool instrumental to aiding actual reduction largely through investment in green technology or more sustainable initiatives. 56 It is, indeed, arguable that Ontario and Quebec's cap and trade system fall under the 'facilitative tool' categorisation. This has been represented as a possible response to the 'political opposition' argument, as the carbon pricing tool itself can be used as a political palliative as done in BC, Alberta and Ontario. 57
In itself, the above might not answer the loss of competitiveness concern of the oil and gas and agricultural industries. While some research suggests that carbon pricing has so far not resulted in significant carbon leakage, it has been found by others that "the risk of carbon leakage is real". 58 In a recent study on the impact of a rise in carbon price to meet the EU's 2030 emission reduction commitment, it was confirmed that such increase will reduce the "competitive advantage of the European industry by approximately 3 percentage points between 2020 and 2030". 59 Indeed, the Rayner et al study noted that being an export reliant province, a carbon tax may place considerable competitive disadvantage on Saskatchewan businesses. 60 It has, however, also been suggested that the competitiveness loss concern "can be managed through 56 Shi Ling-Shu, "Carbon Pricing" in J. Dernbach and M.Gerrard, eds., Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States (Forthcoming, 2017) online: < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3048612> This is distinct from the central underpinning rationale of carbon pricingdeterrence; the idea that if people are made to pay for emissions they will be disincentivized from consuming fossil fuel. Situating carbon pricing in the technology facilitation context blurs its distinction from a technology-centric policy like Saskatchewan. Simply put, it appears the end game is the same: investment in clean technologies. It is, therefore, worth asking if the PCF's carbon pricing mechanism is only distinct process wise, rather than in terms of eventual result. 57 Ibid at 4. 58 OECD & World Bank Group, supra note 31 at 5. The IPCC defines carbon leakage as "the increase in CO2 emissions outside the countries taking domestic mitigation action divided by the reduction in the emissions of these countries". It is demonstrated by a re-allocation of fossil fuel intensive production from jurisdictions with stringent regulatory regimes to jurisdictions with less stringent policies. See IPCC, "Carbon Leakage" online: < https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch11s11-7-2.html>. 59 Matthieu Jalard, et al, "Carbon Pricing and Carbon Leakage Issues in Phase IV of the EU ETS" (2016) online: <https://www.i4ce.org/wp-core/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/rapport-I4CE-chapitre-3.pdf> 60 Supra note 15 at 37. the design of pricing policies or complementary measures". 61 An example of such buffers is the 100% emission allowance granted to top 10% performers (least emitting companies in a trade exposed sector) in the EU. 62 Another way of dealing with this issue is offsetting the cost incurred by relevant industries from carbon pricing revenues. The potential challenge with this is the representation under the proposed Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act (GPPA) allowing the federal government to directly redistribute revenues to 'prescribed persons'. 63 This will effectively hamper provinces' ability to "use carbon pricing revenues according to their needs, including to address impacts on vulnerable populations and sectors …"; the Federal Government's prior commitment. 64 On sectoral exemption under the backstop policy being a likely answer to Saskatchewan's contention, the issue of indirect costs has been raised by the agricultural sector, the second largest and most trade-exposed industry in the province, which is also its second highest emitter. It has been noted that in spite of the exemptions, agriculture producers will bear significant impacts of carbon pricing due to indirect costs. 65 Such indirect costs have been listed to include a 50% increase in the cost of grain drying and 13% increase in trucking costs between 2018 and 2022. 66 Again, this complaint is not insurmountable. Potentially, the waiver basket can be expanded to include more granular items like grain drying or 'agricultural trucking', or the potential indirect 61 OECD & World Bank, supra note 31 at 4 -5. 62 loss can be factored into offsets that will be given to farmers from carbon pricing generated revenue.
What is clear from the foregoing is that Saskatchewan's loss of competitiveness argument against carbon pricing is not foolproof. Perhaps, the arguments that carbon pricing under the PCF lacks prospects for emission effectiveness and is politically unacceptable are more cogent. While the adverse effects of climate change and the need for drastic action are largely accepted, it has been shown that empirical arguments do little to influence public opinion especially as regards carbon pricing. 67 Conversely, Jaccard, et al found that the public is generally more favourably disposed towards non-carbon pricing climate initiatives (flexible (smart) regulatory approach). 68
Saskatchewan's plan is hinged on non-carbon pricing initiatives. Contrariwise, the PCF represents such initiatives as complementary to carbon pricing. The next section appraises particular initiatives proposed under the Prairie resilience, questioning whether such initiatives will satisfactorily satisfy the provinces' climate obligation, without a carbon pricing component.
Saskatchewan's Climate Strategy: Justifications and Blindspot
Saskatchewan touts its climate change plan as a "broad and comprehensive approach, one that connects the very real global problem of climate change to the day-to-day priorities of people". 69
In making 'resilience' its core, the province argues that this "is a much stronger indicator of effective climate action than simply measuring reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, because 67 An often-referenced example is the case of British Columbia where despite favourable tax cuts, 71% of British Columbians feared they will pay more than they got through tax cuts; and only 19% felt carbon tax was the effective way too rein in emissions. See Harrison, supra note 29 at 13. 68 Jaccard et al, supra note 11 at 7. In a 2018 survey commissioned by EcoFiscal, while 52% and 31% of British Colombians indicated their preference for rules and regulations, and technology subsidies respectively, 11% of persons surveyed ranked carbon pricing as their climate policy of choice. See Abacus Data, supra note 17 at 38. 69 Government of Saskatchewan, supra note 45 at 1. it measures our overall ability to adapt, innovate and even thrive". 70 The central features of the Prairie Resilience can be thematically summarised as: technology and innovation; international cooperation; flexible regulation; expanded offset system; and adaptation. It is to these concepts, the arguments in support of them and their potential of satisfying the various dimensions of effectiveness, that we now turn. its clamour for a technology-based climate policy. The $1.5 billion project has been described as the "largest per-capita investment in clean technology in the world". 75 The project is said to reduce GHG emissions by 1 Mt annually and will sequester a total of 40Mt throughout its lifetime. 76 While the Boundary Dam project has been criticized for being overly expensive, its proponents have argued that it is more efficient than the proposed carbon pricing, as it, at considering the likely stringency-lag in implicit pricing. 81 It has also been argued that projects like Boundary Dam CCUS are cost inefficient, of limited coverage and have no behavioral change value. 82 In levelling this criticism, it appears the contextual and comparative nature of the policy options at play have not been taken into consideration.
Contextually, the CCUS option, although expensive, provides Saskatchewan with a chance to keep its emission intensive industries functional and jobs intact, while reducing their carbon footprints. It also apparently serves as a more politically acceptable alternative to Saskatchewanians. 83 It further appears more effective in reducing emissions when compared to PCF's carbon pricing regime. In any case, it has been established that the current carbon pricing design under the PCF will not only potentially have negligible effect on emission reduction, it also lacks the intensity to induce behavioural change. The issue of coverage becomes more insignificant when it is appreciated that CCUS is only one component of What is clear, however, is that whereas the technological approach might lead to substantial emission reduction, it will not be sufficient for economy wide reduction. Hence, while 81 Working Group on Carbon Pricing Mechanisms, supra note 77 at 47. 82 Rayner et al, supra note 15 at 55. 83 APAS, "APAS endorses Saskatchewan Climate Change Strategy" (December 4, 2017) online: <http://www.apas.ca/secondary_id/439?id=1242>. In Rhodes et al 2017 study, while it was found that Saskatchewanians will likely support voluntary policies more, further finding was made that "controlling for all other factors in the model" residents in the province are more likely to support carbon tax than Ontarians. See Rhodes et al, supra note 17 at 62. 84 Government of Saskatchewan, supra note 45 at 5 -6, 7 mainstream CCUS technology is useful in the electricity and oil and gas sectors, it is of limited use in the other top emitting sectors of the Saskatchewan economy (agriculture and transportation). 85 Complementary policy options are therefore necessary. Although seemingly far-fetched, the potential of using the equivalency agreement (EA) tool to resolve the conflicting stances of Saskatchewan and the federal government on carbon pricing is worth exploring. 86 This arrangement can mirror the agreement reached in principle by the provincial and federal governments on the continued 'responsible' sourcing of electricity from coal beyond 2030, as against the express application of the stringency standards contained in Regulations SOR/2012-167. 87 Since an underpinning principle of EA is that federal and provincial regulations should "have the same effect" but not necessarily be identical, 88 Noting that Canada only generates 2% of global emissions, the case is made for Canada's participation in helping to combat what is described as "the other 98 percent". 91 This it proposes to do through the "international transfer of knowledge" and obtaining credits for such transfer through the Paris Agreement's Internationally Transferred Mitigation Outcomes mechanism. 92 While a veiled case was made for obtaining credits from its export of uranium and transfer of advanced agricultural practices and equipment, 93 Saskatchewan's most likely avenue to generate ITMO is through its CCUS technology. 94 Subject to further provisions in the yet-to-be-released accounting rules under Article 6(7) of the Paris Agreement, an appreciation of the features of the ITMO mechanism can be gleaned from Article 6 of the Agreement.
ITMO generally entails: voluntary emission mitigating and sustainable development fostering
activities by private or public entities in other countries which are authorized by a Party State; use of achieved emissions to satisfy an intervening State's NDC insofar as the host State is not using same; and compliance with robust accounting rules to ensure the effectiveness and integrity of the system. 95 The foregoing presupposes that Saskatchewan and its industries can only participate in the ITMO mechanism with the permission of the Federal Government. For initiatives to be credit-earning, there must be a prior agreement with host States. The latter 90 Government of Saskatchewan, supra note 43 at 15. 91 Ibid 92 Government of Saskatchewan, supra note 45 at 3, 8. 93 The argument has been made that since Saskatchewan produces 15% of uranium used for the generation of nuclear energy globally, which helps avoid 2.5 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide annually, it should be "credited with 375 Mt of global emissions per year". Government of Saskatchewan, supra note 41 at 6, 12. It is highly unlikely that this argument can find coverage under the ITMO mechanism, as for one, raw materials (uranium) do not in themselves constitute a green technology or knowledge. 94 Government of Saskatchewan, supra note 43 at 32 -34. 95 See Paris Agreement, art 6 (1) -(5). point will potentially be a limiter to the utility of ITMOs by an intervening State. This is because, unlike under the Kyoto Protocol where the clean development mechanism (CDM) allows for credit earning from States with no commitments, 96 all Party States to the Paris Agreement are obligated to reduce emissions according to their NDCs. 97 For example, in its 2018 National Communication to the UNFCCC, Canada referenced its CCUS knowledge sharing engagements with Mexico, with Saskatchewan's CCUS platforms as a pivot. 98 In the event that these engagements culminate in the installation of CCUS units in Mexico, which of both countries can claim the credits? It is hard to imagine that Mexico will willy-nilly yield the credits to Canada, given its own obligations under the Paris Agreement. It is worth asking if Canada can claim credits for the knowledge transferred, if Mexico proceeds with CCUS installation without Canada's further involvement? To guide against double counting, the above issues should be dealt with in the design of rules and modalities for the ITMO mechanism.
While one might be tempted to propose the adoption of Joint Implementation (JI) accounting process under the Kyoto Protocol, some fundamental differences between ITMO and JI might make such adoption unadvisable. For one, JI's emphasis on 'projects' differs from ITMO's focus on "cooperative approaches". 99 Thus, whereas 'knowledge sharing' might not constitute 'project' for the purposes of JI, they can be subsumed under 'cooperative approaches'. For Saskatchewan's attempt to rely on ITMO to meet its emission reduction obligation, therefore, other features of flexible climate regulations. The case for flexible regulation is largely premised on incentivizing innovation. 104 The Saskatchewan climate plan, to varying degrees, seeks to apply this form of regulation in respect of its electricity sector, oil and gas sector, large industry, built environment and annual reporting. 105 In respect of its oil and gas industry for example, the province intends, "in consultation with … industry, develop regulations" for the reduction of GHG "using a results-based system" allowing each operator to reduce emissions efficiently. 106 Another instance is the proposed regulation of non-oil and gas large industrial emitters through a "sector-specific output-based performance standards on facilities emitting more than 25,000 tonnes of CO2e per year". 107 Such emitters will be required to take where "the goal is too important, the target population too diffuse or the activity being regulated too risky", such flexibility is undesirable or impracticable. 110 Further, the inefficiency of flexible regulations, compared to carbon pricing, has also been highlighted. 111 A follow-up to the above criticisms is the complexity of effectively monitoring flexible regimes given the disparate standards applied by emitters, even within one sector. Howbeit, a counter-argument is that there is no such thing as 'permanence' in emission reduction. Rather, focus should be on appraising the "value of temporary storage". 119 Buttressing this point, it has been argued that contrary to popular representation of emission avoidance measures (e.g. use of renewable energy) as permanent avoidance schemes, it is not unlikely that presently unexplored fossil resources will be exploited in the future, hence, triggering the release of emissions from unexplored fossil fuel. 120 115 Government of Canada, supra note 97 at 129. 116 The counter-argument regardless, it can hardly be maintained that the probability of leakage from soil sequestered carbon is lower than emissions avoided through mainstream avoidance measures (e.g. energy efficiency measures and renewable energy). It is, therefore, important to reflect this (temporary sequestering) characteristic of soil and forest sinks in granting offset credits for them. One way to do this is the establishment of a "soil sink C bank and Leasing System", where "C Sinks would be put in a CO2 bank and leased to emitters who would be obligated to repay … in the future". 121 This is said to potentially aid in achieving net emission reduction even if CO2 is lost from the banked stock. 122 v. Adaptation and Resilience: Saskatchewan also emphasises adaptation and resilience in its proposal. The province cites as its motivation its "many varied and costly climate-related events … and exposure to changing climate" due to the integral position of land to its economy. 123 Further to this, initiatives including landscape integrity restoration, further research into climate trends and adaptation options, advancement in stream flow measurement and flood damage mitigation projects, are contained in the province's plan. 124 While Saskatchewan is undoubtedly prone to extreme weather, the claim that resilience/adaptation, as against mitigation, is a "stronger indicator of effective climate action" is questionable. is cause-oriented, adaptation is effect-dependent. It therefore goes to reasoning that when the 'cause' is effectively dealt with, the 'result' will either be non-existent or minimal. 126 A more credible case would, however, be that the proneness of provinces like Saskatchewan to extreme weather events, and the costs of adaptation or resilience measures be factored in, in the allocation of emission reduction burdens. This is consistent with the equitable demands of effective climate policy. However, to represent resilience initiatives as alternatives to mitigation projects is misconceived, to say the least.
iv. Expanded Offset
When the PCF is viewed as a bundle of interconnected components made up of carbon pricing, complementary climate actions, adaptation and resilience and innovation, rather than a lone initiative (carbon pricing) framework, it is difficult to discern any marked difference between it and Saskatchewan's strategy. For one, Saskatchewan's strategy basically ticks 'PCF's boxes' less carbon pricing. Even the supposed focus of the province's strategy on resilience and adaptation, in substance, mirrors the PCF's position on the same matter. For example, the PCF notes that "taking action to adapt to … climate impacts will help protect Canadians from climate change risks, build resilience, reduce costs, and ensure that society thrives in a changing climate". 127 It further appears that the perceived difference between the PCF's carbon pricing design and Saskatchewan's position is exaggerated. The output-based component of the backstop plan and the performance standard under Saskatchewan's policy are essentially the same, except for their coverage. For one, both seem to favour the best-in-class performance system in fixing emission ceiling. 126 Ibid. 127 Government of Canada, supra note 2 at 27. If carefully designed, implemented, measured and monitored, reworking Saskatchewan's proposed plan in the light of the foregoing analysis could, potentially, bring it to par with or beyond PCF's emission reduction projection. While the fear of Saskatchewan becoming a carbon leakage jurisdiction within Canada is not unfounded, there seems to be limited chances that businesses will change locations because of the non-existence of a non-explicit carbon pricing mechanism in the province. More so, there is no proof that businesses have moved from BC, Ontario and Alberta (including Quebec) to other Canadian provinces since the initiation of their different pricing mechanisms. The similarities and dissimilarities between Saskatchewan's strategy and the policies of these select provinces are considered in the next part of this work.
IV. Comparing Policies: Saskatchewan, British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta
The PCF generally highlights British Columbia (BC), Ontario and Alberta climate policies as standards for other provinces, mandating that for any pricing mechanism to be deemed acceptable, such must comply with the designs in any of the three provinces. 128 This jurisdictional comparison is necessary to determine whether or not Saskatchewan, via its climate strategy, is making a fair contribution to Canada's emission reduction target. Particularly, Alberta makes for an ideal comparator, considering that except for some basic differences, it shares similar geographical and economic features with Saskatchewan. Using PCF's four pillars as pointers, table 3 provides a summary of the similarities and differences among the policies of these provinces, and further compares their projected results. The table's contents, however, only focus on the primary features of each province's policy, rather than being an in-depth analysis of those policies.
128 Supra note 2 at 50. The Ontario climate policy considered here is its 2016 climate change action plan. While the above table evidences the disparity between the tailored policies of the compared jurisdictions, it also evinces some similarities. To appreciate these similarities, the highlighted sectors will be generally classified into utility and economic sectors. 129 It is apparent from Table   2 that provinces are generally more willing to cut emissions in their utility sectors than their major economic sectors. Exemplifying this are British Columbia and Ontario, whose most substantial emission reduction efforts, so far, have come from their utility sectors, viz, the electricity sector. 130 This point is made even clearer in EcoFiscal's recently commissioned survey which found that most people believe that resource economy should be developed, even as Canada transitions to a low carbon economy. 131 It is, therefore, not surprising that, rather than its oil and gas industry which produces 46% of its emissions, Alberta's highest proposed reduction is from its electricity sector. Similarly, compared to Saskatchewan's projected reduction of 4 -4.5Mt from its oil and gas industry, it has projected a reduction of 6Mt from its electricity sector.
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The point on the seeming unpreparedness to take emission reduction actions in their critical trade exposed economies is crucial, as this is the crux of Saskatchewan's non-readiness to accept or make policies with adverse effects on its oil and gas and agricultural sectors. For example, although a primarily service-centred economy, British Columbia's industrial sector contributes a substantial portion of its GDP and makes for about 28% of its emissions. The province will, however, be making about its lowest reduction in the said sector. This also applies to Ontario which in respect of its exposed car manufacturing sector, opted for a collaborative approach to 129 Utility sectors include service providing sectors like electricity, transportation and built; while economic sectors are revenue generating sectors like Industry, oil and gas and agricultural sectors. This classification is however not sacrosanct, as in certain provinces, a sector could double as both utility and economic (e.g. BC's electricity sector). 130 As noted by Jaccard et al, the most impactful emission reduction initiative taken by Ontario was the ban on coalfired power plants, resulting in an annual reduction of 27Mt; while BC's most effective initiatives are the closure of two coal-fired power plants and prevention of a large gas-fired plant, resulting in a 10-15Mt annual emission reduction (3 times above the BC's current $30 carbon tax). See Jaccard et al, supra note 11 at 9. 131 Abacus Data, Supra note 17 at 47, 54 -57. enforcing its Zero-Emissions Vehicle mandate as against imposing penalties on defaulters. 132 This is not unlike Saskatchewan's preference for a collaborative regulatory approach for its oil and gas industry.
The foregoing informs the conclusion that the utility sectors are the 'low hanging fruits' of emission reductions. As also noted by others, having executed the relatively easier and cheaper emission reduction initiatives, it will be more difficult going forward, specifically for provinces like British Columbia and Ontario, which have achieved substantial reductions from their utility sectors. An example of this is British Columbia which has experienced a gradual rise in emissions from 2010 and has 2050 as the target date for its modest projections. 133 This is also the case of Ontario, which, as at 2015, was less than halfway to achieving its target of reducing its emissions to 15% below 1990 levels. 134 Having identified that utilities provide the easier sources of emission reduction, one way of appraising whether Saskatchewan's reduction target compares fairly with the identified jurisdictions, is to consider the reduction commitments made in respect of its utility sectors, particularly, electricity. As shown in the reductions in their electricity sectors because of the availability of alternative renewable sources, such an argument becomes parlous when Alberta's situation is considered. As at 2013, 17% of Alberta's total emissions, amounting to about 23Mt, was from the electricity sector. However, it projects to make a 24Mt reduction in that sector by 2030. Alberta plans achieving this through 100% coal phase-out and 30% renewable energy by 2030. Simply put, a 100% phase-out from coal in addition to existing projections from other sectors will potentially bring Saskatchewan close to achieving 30% reduction relative to 2005 emissions. This will also allow it to efficiently deploy its capital intensive CCUS technology for the purposes of its oil and gas and mining sectors. The failure of Saskatchewan to commit to a complete or more substantial phase-out of coal plants, or even make concrete commitments as regards its transportation sector which contributes 14% of its emissions, are indicative of the province's unreadiness to contribute its fair share to achieving the country's emission reduction target.
V. Conclusion
This paper has highlighted justifications for and loopholes in Saskatchewan's claims and case against the Pan-Canadian Framework. It is evident from the above that while some of these claims are credible and deserve consideration, others are not so defensible. The Saskatchewan situation provides a unique opportunity to attempt to 'turnover-proof' the PCF. A two-pronged approach to achieving an effective, flexible and equitable 'turnover-proof framework' is laid out in subsequent paragraphs.
i. Burden Sharing -Lessons from the EU: The PCF's most profound oddity is perhaps its focus on the implementation of unarticulated climate targets. As noted earlier, nowhere in the PCF were specific emission reduction targets allocated to provinces. Indeed, it is doubtful that the subject even featured in the pre-PCF drafting phase. 137 One explanation for this is the divisiveness of the subject in previous similar Pan-Canadian climate policy attempts. 138 This, however, takes nothing away from the centrality of the subject. Like Canada, the European Union (EU) was confronted with the difficulty of coming up with a generally acceptable allocation formula for its member States. Unlike Canada, rather than shy away from the issue, the EU adopted the triptych approach which took into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each party state, while ensuring that substantial emission reduction is achieved. 139 The Triptych model is basically a three-step approach:
i. Identification of categories (sectors) of emissions through the main issues raised by parties during negotiations. 140 ii. Calculation of emission allowances for each of the sectors based on peculiar circumstances. 141 iii. Adding up sectoral allowances to a national (provincial) allowance or target. 142 While it has been criticized for its complexity, extensive data requirement and reliance on uncertain future growth projections, 143 the flexibility of Triptych, which allows parties to meet allotted targets by employing tools unique to them, is widely agreed to be its greatest strength.
One point that must be stressed is that the Triptych is more of a burden sharing instrument and less of an implementation tool. Its sectoral approach to arriving at a total target for each party simply helps to consider sectoral emission reduction potentials vis-à-vis best reduction options for party States. This provides negotiating parties a clearer picture, not only of how their obligations are arrived at, but also their capacity to achieve such targets. Another component of Triptych is the emission allowance given to developing European States ('cohesion countries'). 144 It is again worth emphasising that whereas sectors are considered before allocating targets to parties, such allocations are not imposed sectorally.
The data intensive nature and overall complexity of Triptych makes it more fitting for a setup with few member parties. Therefore, it is not surprising that (partially) due to its increased membership, the European Union designed and adopted a Climate and Energy Package (CEP) to replace the Triptych approach in 2008. But compared to the 28-member States EU, Triptych is more fitting for a country like Canada which has fewer constituents (provinces), certainty of jurisdictional delineation and centrally collected climate related data. It is noteworthy that CEP is fundamentally designed around similar themes as the Triptych; particularly, fixing of specific emission reduction targets, flexible implementation options, allowances for trade exposed sectors and recognition of national circumstances. 145 In fact, the CEP can be cast in a Triptych mould as it entails the EU Emission Trading System (EU ETS) which mainly covers the energy intensive and power producing sectors previously under Triptych; and an Effort Sharing Decision arrived at through consideration of per capita income of countries. 146 In consonance with the flexibility theme, countries are allowed to transfer emission rights. 147 While it is doubtful if the EU ETS can work in Canada, given the seeming unpopularity of carbon pricing, 148 Triptych provides a viable tool with which equitable and flexible allocations can be made to Canadian PTs. Table 2 provides a peephole into how Canada can rework the Triptych to fit its unique situation. As noted earlier, the Table shows the overall disposition of provinces towards the utility and economic (trade exposed) sectors, in that, while provinces are generally ready to make deep cuts in respect of their utility sectors, they are not so disposed as regards their economic sectors. Potentially, while a per capita criterion can be applied to calculating emissions from utilities (domestic sector), a combination of energy efficiency and emission intensity can be applied to the economic sectors. Again, this proposed formula is to arrive at emission reduction targets which provinces will consider equitable and does not impose any specific implementation mode. Such an approach will likely be popular with all provinces, if positions taken at the 2000 NCCP negotiations were to be maintained. In the said negotiations, western provinces, like Alberta, favoured a sectoral approach to burden sharing, while eastern provinces, like Quebec, contended that such an approach will hurt its pulp and paper industry, rather preferring a per capita approach. 149 An adapted Triptych offers an opportunity to blend these conflicting positions in one burden sharing policy.
ii. Strict-Flexible Implementation: Consistent with Triptych, PTs should be allowed to meet allocated targets using the most effective and efficient tools available to them. The role of the Federal Government (FG) should be to maintain a strict oversight regime to guarantee that PTs meet targets as and when due. This is mandatory if effective emission reduction through flexible tools is to be achieved. As noted elsewhere, "flexible approaches are more likely to be … sustained when a comprehensive, independent and centralized environmental agency provides for guidance, coordination and consistency in policy choices". 150 Such an oversight will, no doubt also, entail the FG vetting PTs' climate programmes to guarantee the integrity of the system. Table 3 gives a skeletal overview of principles which could inform such vetting process.
While claims categorised as justifiable deserve consideration, those classified as unjustifiable do not. Context can, however, be built around borderline claims. For example, while carbon pricing might, indeed, be apt for service-oriented economies like British Columbia, it is less 149 Hartman, et al, supra note 1 at 30. 150 Kochtcheeva, supra note 100 at 10. likely so for trade exposed economies like Saskatchewan. This makes it necessary to permit Saskatchewan to bring to the table its most emission-effective and cost-efficient option. On the reverse, Saskatchewan should not be allowed to rely on its resilience claim to shirk further responsibility. Resilience concerns, although with diverse impact potentials on provinces, are by no means peculiar to Saskatchewan. However, claims on land use and international offsets are useful tools depending on the thoroughness of the monitoring and accounting systems. This is one other area in which the oversight role of the FG is crucial.
Further, in lieu of making a carbon tax system mandatory country-wide, a national offset system should be set up and coordinated by the FG to give greater flexibility to PTs in their attempts to meet their allocation emission targets. Provinces should have the option of undertaking emission reduction projects in provinces where such initiatives are more cost effective. While the challenges of similar arrangements under the Kyoto Protocol (CDM and JI) are well documented, an inter-provincial offset system will be more easily manageable and regulated, given its more limited scope. Another vital component of the implementation limb is the availability of financial buffers for provinces that will potentially bear more climate mitigation and adaptation costs. It is settled that, regardless the scenario, provinces like Alberta and Saskatchewan will bear higher mitigation costs. Equity requires that such provinces be supported by the FG. In this regard, Hartman et al, have proposed a two-pronged financial support structure entailing a baseline federal funding for complementary actions in all provinces and a 'selective envelope of funding' which a new institution will disburse to even the burdens of emissions reduction. 151 151 Hartman, et al, supra note 1 at 49. Canada can and should go beyond its present commitments under the PA. So far, it has fallen short, and the PCF, in its present state, appears unlikely to facilitate the attainment of such lofty climate aspirations. The above proposed two-limbs recommendation has taken into consideration the themes of effectiveness, equity and flexibility which Saskatchewan has anchored its opposition to the PCF on. While not immune from criticism, the value of the recommendations contained in this work is rooted in its potential to reboot the climate discourse in a more nuanced context and make up for current gaps in the existing framework. Again, these recommendations can potentially help 'turn-over proof' the national climate framework. Further, the foregoing responds to two concerns raised in the recent collaborative report by auditors-general in respect of the Canadian climate policy: the absence of measurable targets and a defined monitoring structure. 152 While these recommendations might not be sufficient to drive Canada to zeroemission, they hold the promise of moving the country further from where it currently is. 152 Collaborative Report, supra note 4 at 4.
